-Let's do an ikiwiki security analysis..
+Let's do an ikiwiki security analysis.
If you are using ikiwiki to render pages that only you can edit, do not
generate any wrappers, and do not use the cgi, then there are no more
others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need
to be kept in mind.
-## html attacks
+----
-ikiwiki does not attempt to do any santization of the html on the wiki.
-MarkDown allows embedding of arbitrary html into a markdown document. If
-you let anyone else edit files on the wiki, then anyone can have fun exploiting
-the web browser bug of the day. This type of attack is typically referred
-to as an XSS attack ([google](http://www.google.com/search?q=xss+attack)).
+# Probable holes
-## image files etc attacks
+_(The list of things to fix.)_
+
+## commit spoofing
+
+Anyone with direct commit access can forge "web commit from foo" and
+make it appear on [[RecentChanges]] like foo committed. One way to avoid
+this would be to limit web commits to those done by a certian user.
+
+## other stuff to look at
+
+I need to audit the git backend a bit, and have been meaning to
+see if any CRLF injection type things can be done in the CGI code.
+
+----
+
+# Potential gotchas
+
+_(Things not to do.)_
+
+## image file etc attacks
If it enounters a file type it does not understand, ikiwiki just copies it
into place. So if you let users add any kind of file they like, they can
-upload images, movies, windows executables, etc. If these files exploit
-security holes in the browser of someone who's viewing the wiki, that can
-be a security problem.
+upload images, movies, windows executables, css files, etc (though not html
+files). If these files exploit security holes in the browser of someone
+who's viewing the wiki, that can be a security problem.
-## exploting ikiwiki with bad content
+Of course nobody else seems to worry about this in other wikis, so should we?
-Someone could add bad content to the wiki and hope to exploit ikiwiki.
-Note that ikiwiki runs with perl taint checks on, so this is unlikely;
-the only data that is not subject to full taint checking is the names of
-files, and filenames are sanitised.
+Currently only people with direct svn commit access can upload such files
+(and if you wanted to you could block that with a svn pre-commit hook).
+Users with only web commit access are limited to editing pages as ikiwiki
+doesn't support file uploads from browsers (yet), so they can't exploit
+this.
-## cgi scripts
+## multiple accessors of wiki directory
-ikiwiki does not allow cgi scripts to be published as part of the wiki. Or
-rather, the script is published, but it's not marked executable, so
-hopefully your web server will not run it.
+If multiple people can write to the source directory ikiwiki is using, or
+to the destination directory it writes files to, then one can cause trouble
+for the other when they run ikiwiki through symlink attacks.
+
+So it's best if only one person can ever write to those directories.
+
+## setup files
+
+Setup files are not safe to keep in subversion with the rest of the wiki.
+Just don't do it. [[ikiwiki.setup]] is *not* used as the setup file for
+this wiki, BTW.
+
+## page locking can be bypassed via direct svn commits
+
+A locked page can only be edited on the web by an admin, but
+anyone who is allowed to commit direct to svn can bypass this. This is by
+design, although a subversion pre-commit hook could be used to prevent
+editing of locked pages when using subversion, if you really need to.
## web server attacks
server parsed html files), then if you let anyone else add files to the wiki,
they can try to use this to exploit your web server.
-## --gen-wrapper might generate insecure wrappers
+----
+
+# Hopefully non-holes
+
+_(AKA, the assumptions that will be the root of most security holes...)_
-ikiwiki --gen-wrapper is intended to generate a wrapper program that
+## exploting ikiwiki with bad content
+
+Someone could add bad content to the wiki and hope to exploit ikiwiki.
+Note that ikiwiki runs with perl taint checks on, so this is unlikely.
+
+One fun thing in ikiwiki is its handling of a PageSpec, which involves
+translating it into perl and running the perl. Of course, this is done
+*very* carefully to guard against injecting arbitrary perl code.
+
+## publishing cgi scripts
+
+ikiwiki does not allow cgi scripts to be published as part of the wiki. Or
+rather, the script is published, but it's not marked executable (except in
+the case of "destination directory file replacement" below), so hopefully
+your web server will not run it.
+
+## suid wrappers
+
+ikiwiki --wrapper is intended to generate a wrapper program that
runs ikiwiki to update a given wiki. The wrapper can in turn be made suid,
for example to be used in a [[post-commit]] hook by people who cannot write
to the html pages, etc.
If the wrapper script is made suid, then any bugs in this wrapper would be
-security holes. The wrapper is written as securely as I know how and
-there's been no problem yet.
+security holes. The wrapper is written as securely as I know how, is based
+on code that has a history of security use long before ikiwiki, and there's
+been no problem yet.
+
+## shell exploits
+
+ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use
+system() at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the
+wiki admin and untainted filenames. And it runs with taint checks on of
+course..
+
+## cgi data security
+
+When ikiwiki runs as a cgi to edit a page, it is passed the name of the
+page to edit. It has to make sure to sanitise this page, to prevent eg,
+editing of ../../../foo, or editing of files that are not part of the wiki,
+such as subversion dotfiles. This is done by sanitising the filename
+removing unallowed characters, then making sure it doesn't start with "/"
+or contain ".." or "/.svn/". Annoyingly ad-hoc, this kind of code is where
+security holes breed. It needs a test suite at the very least.
+
+## CGI::Session security
+
+I've audited this module and it is massively insecure by default. ikiwiki
+uses it in one of the few secure ways; by forcing it to write to a
+directory it controls (and not /tmp) and by setting a umask that makes the
+file not be world readable.
+
+## cgi password security
+
+Login to the wiki involves sending a password in cleartext over the net.
+Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki as that user though.
+If you care, you can use https, I suppose.
+
+## XSS holes in CGI output
+
+ikiwiki has not yet been audited to ensure that all cgi script input/output
+is sanitised to prevent XSS attacks. For example, a user can't register
+with a username containing html code (anymore).
+
+It's difficult to know for sure if all such avenues have really been
+closed though.
+
+## HTML::Template security
+
+If the [[plugins/template]] plugin is enabled, users can modify templates
+like any other part of the wiki. This assumes that HTML::Template is secure
+when used with untrusted/malicious templates. (Note that includes are not
+allowed, so that's not a problem.)
+
+----
+
+# Fixed holes
+
+_(Unless otherwise noted, these were discovered and immediately fixed by the
+ikiwiki developers.)_
+
+## destination directory file replacement
+
+Any file in the destination directory that is a valid page filename can be
+replaced, even if it was not originally rendered from a page. For example,
+ikiwiki.cgi could be edited in the wiki, and it would write out a
+replacement. File permission is preseved. Yipes!
+
+This was fixed by making ikiwiki check if the file it's writing to exists;
+if it does then it has to be a file that it's aware of creating before, or
+it will refuse to create it.
+
+Still, this sort of attack is something to keep in mind.
## symlink attacks
some other tree that it shouldn't? svn supports symlinks, so one can get
into the repo. ikiwiki uses File::Find to traverse the repo, and does not
tell it to follow symlinks, but it might be possible to race replacing a
-directory with a symlink and trick it into following.
+directory with a symlink and trick it into following the link.
-It would certianly be possible to start out with a directory, let ikiwiki
-run and find a file in there, then replace it with a symlink, and ikiwiki
-would then go ahead and follow the symlink when it went to open that file
-to read it. If it was some private file and was running suid, that could be
-bad.
+Also, if someone checks in a symlink to /etc/passwd, ikiwiki would read and
+publish that, which could be used to expose files a committer otherwise
+wouldn't see.
-TODO: seems that locking to prevent more than one ikiwiki run at a time
-would both fix this and is a good idea in general. With locking, an
-attacker couldn't get ikiwiki to svn up while another instance was running.
+To avoid this, ikiwiki will skip over symlinks when scanning for pages, and
+uses locking to prevent more than one instance running at a time. The lock
+prevents one ikiwiki from running a svn up at the wrong time to race
+another ikiwiki. So only attackers who can write to the working copy on
+their own can race it.
-Even with locking, if an attacker has local write access to the checkout,
-they could still fool ikiwiki using similar races. So it's best if only one
-person can ever write to the checkout that ikiwiki compiles the moo from.
+## symlink + cgi attacks
-## cgi security
+Similarly, a svn commit of a symlink could be made, ikiwiki ignores it
+because of the above, but the symlink is still there, and then you edit the
+page from the web, which follows the symlink when reading the page
+(exposing the content), and again when saving the changed page (changing
+the content).
-When ikiwiki runs as a cgi to edit a page, it is passed the name of the
-page to edit. It has to make sure to sanitise this page, to prevent eg,
-editing of ../../../foo, or editing of files that are not part of the wiki,
-such as subversion dotfiles. This is done by sanitising the filename
-removing unallowed characters, then making sure it doesn't start with "/"
-or contain ".." or "/.svn/". Annoyingly ad-hoc, this kind of code is where
-security holes breed.
+This was fixed for page saving by making ikiwiki refuse to write to files
+that are symlinks, or that are in subdirectories that are symlinks,
+combined with the above locking.
+
+For page editing, it's fixed by ikiwiki checking to make sure that it
+already has found a page by scanning the tree, before loading it for
+editing, which as described above, also is done in a way that avoids
+symlink attacks.
+
+## underlaydir override attacks
+
+ikiwiki also scans an underlaydir for pages, this is used to provide stock
+pages to all wikis w/o needing to copy them into the wiki. Since ikiwiki
+internally stores only the base filename from the underlaydir or srcdir,
+and searches for a file in either directory when reading a page source,
+there is the potential for ikiwiki's scanner to reject a file from the
+srcdir for some reason (such as it being contained in a directory that is
+symlinked in), find a valid copy of the file in the underlaydir, and then
+when loading the file, mistakenly load the bad file from the srcdir.
+
+This attack is avoided by making ikiwiki refuse to add any files from the
+underlaydir if a file also exists in the srcdir with the same name.
+
+## multiple page source issues
+
+Note that I previously worried that underlay override attacks could also be
+accomplished if ikiwiki were extended to support other page markup
+languages besides markdown. However, a closer look indicates that this is
+not a problem: ikiwiki does preserve the file extension when storing the
+source filename of a page, so a file with another extension that renders to
+the same page name can't bypass the check. Ie, ikiwiki won't skip foo.rst
+in the srcdir, find foo.mdwn in the underlay, decide to render page foo and
+then read the bad foo.mdwn. Instead it will remember the .rst extension and
+only render a file with that extension.
+
+## XSS attacks in page content
+
+ikiwiki supports protecting users from their own broken browsers via the
+[[plugins/htmlscrubber]] plugin, which is enabled by default.
+
+## svn commit logs
+
+It's was possible to force a whole series of svn commits to appear to
+have come just before yours, by forging svn log output. This was
+guarded against by using svn log --xml.
+
+ikiwiki escapes any html in svn commit logs to prevent other mischief.
+
+## XML::Parser
+
+XML::Parser is used by the aggregation plugin, and has some security holes.
+Bug #[378411](http://bugs.debian.org/378411) does not
+seem to affect our use, since the data is not encoded as utf-8 at that
+point. #[378412](http://bugs.debian.org/378412) could affect us, although it
+doesn't seem very exploitable. It has a simple fix, and has been fixed in
+Debian unstable.
sipb-www / ikiwiki.git / blobdiff