others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need
to be kept in mind.
+----
+
# Probable holes
-## html attacks
+_(The list of things to fix.)_
+
+## svn commit logs
+
+Anyone with svn commit access can forge "web commit from foo" and make it
+appear on [[RecentChanges]] like foo committed. One way to avoid this would
+be to limit web commits to those done by a certian user.
+
+It's actually possible to force a whole series of svn commits to appear to
+have come just before yours, by forging svn log output. This could be
+guarded against by using svn log --xml.
+
+ikiwiki escapes any html in svn commit logs to prevent other mischief.
+
+----
+
+# Potential gotchas
-ikiwiki does not attempt to do any santization of the html on the wiki.
-[[MarkDown]] allows embedding of arbitrary html into a markdown document. If
-you let anyone else edit files on the wiki, then anyone can have fun exploiting
-the web browser bug of the day. This type of attack is typically referred
-to as an XSS attack ([google](http://www.google.com/search?q=xss+attack)).
+_(Things not to do.)_
-## image files etc attacks
+## image file etc attacks
If it enounters a file type it does not understand, ikiwiki just copies it
into place. So if you let users add any kind of file they like, they can
-upload images, movies, windows executables, css files, etc. If these files
-exploit security holes in the browser of someone who's viewing the wiki,
-that can be a security problem.
+upload images, movies, windows executables, css files, etc (though not html
+files). If these files exploit security holes in the browser of someone
+who's viewing the wiki, that can be a security problem.
Of course nobody else seems to worry about this in other wikis, so should we?
-## web server attacks
-
-If your web server does any parsing of special sorts of files (for example,
-server parsed html files), then if you let anyone else add files to the wiki,
-they can try to use this to exploit your web server.
+Currently only people with direct svn commit access can upload such files
+(and if you wanted to you could block that with a svn pre-commit hook).
+Wsers with only web commit access are limited to editing pages as ikiwiki
+doesn't support file uploads from browsers (yet), so they can't exploit
+this.
## multiple accessors of wiki directory
Just don't do it. [[ikiwiki.setup]] is *not* used as the setup file for
this wiki, BTW.
-## svn commit logs
-
-Anyone with svn commit access can forge "web commit from foo" and make it
-appear on [[RecentChanges]] like foo committed. One way to avoid this would
-be to limit web commits to those done by a certian user.
-
-It's actually possible to force a whole series of svn commits to appear to
-have come just before yours, by forging svn log output. This could be
-guarded against by using svn log --xml.
-
-ikiwiki escapes any html in svn commit logs to prevent other mischief.
-
## page locking can be bypassed via direct svn commits
-A [[lock]]ed page can only be edited on the web by an admin, but
+A locked page can only be edited on the web by an admin, but
anyone who is allowed to commit direct to svn can bypass this. This is by
design, although a subversion pre-commit hook could be used to prevent
editing of locked pages when using subversion, if you really need to.
+## web server attacks
+
+If your web server does any parsing of special sorts of files (for example,
+server parsed html files), then if you let anyone else add files to the wiki,
+they can try to use this to exploit your web server.
+
----
# Hopefully non-holes
-(AKA, the assumptions that will be the root of most security holes...)
+_(AKA, the assumptions that will be the root of most security holes...)_
## exploting ikiwiki with bad content
Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki as that user though.
If you care, you can use https, I suppose.
+## XSS holes in CGI output
+
+ikiwiki has not yet been audited to ensure that all cgi script input/output
+is sanitised to prevent XSS attacks. For example, a user can't register
+with a username containing html code (anymore).
+
+It's difficult to know for sure if all such avenues have really been
+closed though.
+
+----
+
# Fixed holes
_(Unless otherwise noted, these were discovered and immediatey fixed by the
rendering the wrong thing. This is not currently possible, but must be kept
in mind in the future when for example adding support for generating html
pages from source with some other extension.
+
+## XSS attacks in page content
+
+ikiwiki supports [[HtmlSanitization]], though it can be turned off.
sipb-www / ikiwiki.git / blobdiff