X-Git-Url: https://sipb.mit.edu/gitweb.cgi/ikiwiki.git/blobdiff_plain/8a5f9f6e0047149040c50db571faac89ab443085..4ad7c9d6257ca106b2949d22f6300823190991a0:/doc/security.mdwn diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn index 4db756e2e..9d7702dde 100644 --- a/doc/security.mdwn +++ b/doc/security.mdwn @@ -18,14 +18,6 @@ Anyone with direct commit access can forge "web commit from foo" and make it appear on [[RecentChanges]] like foo committed. One way to avoid this would be to limit web commits to those done by a certian user. -## XML::Parser - -XML::Parser is used by the aggregation plugin, and has some security holes -that are still open in Debian unstable as of this writing. #378411 does not -seem to affect our use, since the data is not encoded as utf-8 at that -point. #378412 could affect us, although it doesn't seem very exploitable. -It has a simple fix, which should be NMUed or something.. - ## other stuff to look at I need to audit the git backend a bit, and have been meaning to @@ -91,6 +83,10 @@ _(AKA, the assumptions that will be the root of most security holes...)_ Someone could add bad content to the wiki and hope to exploit ikiwiki. Note that ikiwiki runs with perl taint checks on, so this is unlikely. +One fun thing in ikiwiki is its handling of a PageSpec, which involves +translating it into perl and running the perl. Of course, this is done +*very* carefully to guard against injecting arbitrary perl code. + ## publishing cgi scripts ikiwiki does not allow cgi scripts to be published as part of the wiki. Or @@ -138,7 +134,9 @@ file not be world readable. Login to the wiki involves sending a password in cleartext over the net. Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki as that user though. -If you care, you can use https, I suppose. +If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use https either for +all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using the sslcookie +option. ## XSS holes in CGI output @@ -149,6 +147,13 @@ with a username containing html code (anymore). It's difficult to know for sure if all such avenues have really been closed though. +## HTML::Template security + +If the [[plugins/template]] plugin is enabled, users can modify templates +like any other part of the wiki. This assumes that HTML::Template is secure +when used with untrusted/malicious templates. (Note that includes are not +allowed, so that's not a problem.) + ---- # Fixed holes @@ -242,3 +247,12 @@ have come just before yours, by forging svn log output. This was guarded against by using svn log --xml. ikiwiki escapes any html in svn commit logs to prevent other mischief. + +## XML::Parser + +XML::Parser is used by the aggregation plugin, and has some security holes. +Bug #[378411](http://bugs.debian.org/378411) does not +seem to affect our use, since the data is not encoded as utf-8 at that +point. #[378412](http://bugs.debian.org/378412) could affect us, although it +doesn't seem very exploitable. It has a simple fix, and has been fixed in +Debian unstable.