X-Git-Url: https://sipb.mit.edu/gitweb.cgi/ikiwiki.git/blobdiff_plain/8df24a447d9bcae138873bc076432e6a69946d7f..e15e3202eb04048feb302b39d946f1ae1a15c306:/doc/security.mdwn?ds=sidebyside

diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn
index b1e8d03f6..a1c2120ce 100644
--- a/doc/security.mdwn
+++ b/doc/security.mdwn
@@ -315,3 +315,33 @@ This hole was discovered on 21 March 2007 and fixed the same day
 with the release of ikiwiki 1.47. A fix was also backported to Debian etch,
 as version 1.33.3. I recommend upgrading to one of these versions if your
 wiki can be edited by third parties.
+
+## insufficient checking for symlinks in srcdir path
+
+Ikiwiki did not check if path to the srcdir to contained a symlink. If an
+attacker had commit access to the directories in the path, they could
+change it to a symlink, causing ikiwiki to read and publish files that were
+not intended to be published. (But not write to them due to other checks.)
+
+In most configurations, this is not exploitable, because the srcdir is
+checked out of revision control, but the directories leading up to it are
+not. Or, the srcdir is a single subdirectory of a project in revision
+control (ie, `ikiwiki/doc`), and if the subdirectory were a symlink,
+ikiwiki would still typically not follow it.
+
+There are at least two configurations where this is exploitable:
+
+* If the srcdir is a deeper subdirectory of a project. For example if it is
+  `project/foo/doc`, an an attacker can replace `foo` with a symlink to a
+  directory containing a `doc` directory (not a symlink), then ikiwiki
+  would follow the symlink.
+* If the path to the srcdir in ikiwiki's configuration ended in "/", 
+  and the srcdir is a single subdirectory of a project, (ie,
+  `ikiwiki/doc/`), the srcdir could be a symlink and ikiwiki would not
+  notice.
+
+This security hole was discovered on 26 November 2007 and fixed the same
+da with the release of ikiwiki 2.14. I recommend upgrading to this version
+if your wiki can be committed to by third parties. Alternatively, don't use
+a trailing slash in the srcdir, and avoid the (unusual) configurations that
+allow the security hole to be exploited.