From fd160168332e90569f0f87b573a39687797c3fcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "http://schmonz.livejournal.com/" Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2008 15:11:47 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] s/sslrequire/requiressl/g --- doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn b/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn index 1917a242d..2de6fc51f 100644 --- a/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn +++ b/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ Config variables that affect the behavior of `unixauth`: * `unixauth_type`: defaults to unset, can be "checkpassword" or "pwauth" * `unixauth_command`: defaults to unset, should contain the full path and any arguments -* `unixauth_sslrequire`: defaults to 1, can be 0 -* `sslcookie`: needs to be 1 if `unixauth_sslrequire` is 1 (perhaps this should be done automatically?) +* `unixauth_requiressl`: defaults to 1, can be 0 +* `sslcookie`: needs to be 1 if `unixauth_requiressl` is 1 (perhaps this should be done automatically?) __Security__: [As with passwordauth](/security/#index14h2), be wary of sending usernames and passwords in cleartext. Unlike passwordauth, sniffing `unixauth` credentials can get an attacker much further than mere wiki access. Therefore, this plugin defaults to not even _displaying_ the login form fields unless we're running under SSL. Nobody should be able to do anything remotely dumb until the admin has done at least a little thinking. After that, dumb things are always possible. ;-) -- 2.45.0