implemented html sanitisation

[ikiwiki.git] / doc / security.mdwn

diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn
index 3743adea1e61b5225520d4f889b80d0208ad0ca3..00b8e88247205a342a461460da6ad11a02c13389 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/security.mdwn
+++ b/doc/security.mdwn
@@ -8,19 +8,18 @@ to be kept in mind.
 
 # Probable holes
 
-## html attacks
+## XSS holes in CGI output
 
-ikiwiki does not attempt to do any santization of the html on the wiki.
-[[MarkDown]] allows embedding of arbitrary html into a markdown document. If
-you let anyone else edit files on the wiki, then anyone can have fun exploiting
-the web browser bug of the day. This type of attack is typically referred
-to as an XSS attack ([google](http://www.google.com/search?q=xss+attack)).
+ikiwiki has not yet been audited to ensure that all cgi script output is
+sanitised to prevent XSS attacks.
 
 ## image files etc attacks
 
 If it enounters a file type it does not understand, ikiwiki just copies it
 into place. So if you let users add any kind of file they like, they can
-upload images, movies, windows executables, css files, etc. If these files exploit security holes in the browser of someone who's viewing the wiki, that can be a security problem.
+upload images, movies, windows executables, css files, etc (though not html
+files). If these files exploit security holes in the browser of someone
+who's viewing the wiki, that can be a security problem.
 
 Of course nobody else seems to worry about this in other wikis, so should we?
 
@@ -32,7 +31,9 @@ they can try to use this to exploit your web server.
 
 ## multiple accessors of wiki directory
 
-If multiple people can write to the source directory ikiwiki is using, or to the destination directory it writes files to, then one can cause trouble for the other when they run ikiwiki through symlink attacks.
+If multiple people can write to the source directory ikiwiki is using, or
+to the destination directory it writes files to, then one can cause trouble
+for the other when they run ikiwiki through symlink attacks.
 
 So it's best if only one person can ever write to those directories.
 
@@ -44,7 +45,9 @@ this wiki, BTW.
 
 ## svn commit logs
 
-Anyone with svn commit access can forge "web commit from foo" and make it appear on [[RecentChanges]] like foo committed. One way to avoid this would be to limit web commits to those done by a certian user.
+Anyone with svn commit access can forge "web commit from foo" and make it
+appear on [[RecentChanges]] like foo committed. One way to avoid this would
+be to limit web commits to those done by a certian user.
 
 It's actually possible to force a whole series of svn commits to appear to
 have come just before yours, by forging svn log output. This could be
@@ -93,7 +96,8 @@ been no problem yet.
 
 ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use
 system() at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the
-wiki admin and untainted filenames. And it runs with taint checks on of course..
+wiki admin and untainted filenames. And it runs with taint checks on of
+course..
 
 ## cgi data security
 
@@ -120,7 +124,8 @@ If you care, you can use https, I suppose.
 
 # Fixed holes
 
-_(Unless otherwise noted, these were discovered and immediatey fixed by the ikiwiki developers.)_
+_(Unless otherwise noted, these were discovered and immediatey fixed by the
+ikiwiki developers.)_
 
 ## destination directory file replacement
 
@@ -185,3 +190,7 @@ would still be possible to use this attack to confuse ikiwiki into
 rendering the wrong thing. This is not currently possible, but must be kept
 in mind in the future when for example adding support for generating html
 pages from source with some other extension.
+
+## XSS attacks in page content
+
+ikiwiki supports [[HtmlSanitistion]], though it can be turned off.